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Humans are group-oriented: we favor “us” over “them” 
(Cikara & Van Bavel, 2014). Since the early 2000s, 
developmental psychologists have investigated whether this 
predisposition begins early in a child’s life (Chalik & Rhodes, 
2019). By three months of age, infants are able to distinguish 
individuals from one another based on their race and gender 
(Bar-Haim, Ziv, Lamy, Hodes, 2006; Quinn, Yahr, Kuhn, 
Slater, & Pascalis, 2002). Infants develop a preference for 
speakers of their native language by the time they are 10 to 11 
months old (Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 2007, 2012). By one 
year, infants expect that others will prefer playing with members 
of their in-group rather than their out-group (Jin & Baillargeon, 
2017; Baillargeon et al., 2015, Bian, Sloane, & Baillargeon, 
2018). Even toddlers are more interested in helping an in-group 
member over an out-group member (Fehr, Bernhard, & 
Rockenbach, 2008). 
 These findings tell us about whether infants distinguish 
between different groups, whether their expectations about 
helping are influenced by group membership, and whether 
children’s behavior is adjusted depending on group 
membership. Our study asked a different but related question. 
Are children’s judgments about prosocial obligation also 
dependent on group membership? That is, do children think 
individuals are differentially obligated to help others depending 
on group membership?  
 Several studies have explored this question of group 
obligations with mixed results. Specifically, researchers Weller 
and Lagattuta have found that children believe characters have 
a greater obligation to help members of their racial in-group than 
the racial out-group (2013). This trend does not emerge for other 
social categories, namely gender, as participants in a different 
study thought boys and girls were equally obligated to help one 
another (Weller & Lagattuta, 2014). It is then unclear which of 
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Abstract 
We examined whether children (ages 4-9 years) show in-group bias in expectations to help others as well as obligations to help 
others. We showed participants vignettes featuring two novel groups and a variety of scenarios where one character is in need and 
another is a bystander who notices this. Younger children did not show in-group bias in terms of expectations to help others, but 
an in-group bias was present in older children. For obligations, however, we did not find an interaction between age and group: 
children think you have to help in-group members more than out-group members, regardless of age. Children of all ages, despite 
this bias, still think that individuals are obligated to help members of an out-group, just to a lesser degree than they find this 
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these cases represents how children reason about obligations in 
general.  
 To address this question, researchers have moved away 
from using real-world groups, such as race and gender, and 
turned to novel groups to see if the trends differed once taken 
out of the context of real-world scenarios. For example, Rhodes 
(2012) found that 3- to 5-year-olds who were introduced to 
novel groups (Flurps and Zazzes) did not hold discriminant 
expectations: they thought a Zazz was equally as likely to help 
a fellow Zazz as they were to help a Flurp. However, Rhodes 
(2012) only measures children’s group-based expectations, yet 
interprets these findings to mean that children do not consider 
helping to be obligatory (also see Chalik & Rhodes, 2019).  
 There are distinct differences between expectations and 
obligations, which makes the above conclusion incorrect. An 
expectation, in this context, is whether a participant believes that 
an individual will do something, regardless of whether or not it 
is mandatory: it is simply what a participant thinks will happen. 
An obligation is instead what a participant thinks is a required 
action, making it something that an individual has to do. In any 
given scenario, an action may be considered obligatory but still 
not expected; similarly, an action may be expected but not 
obligatory. 
 In another study, Marshall, Wynn, and Bloom (2019), 
told children between the ages of 5 and 9 a story involving a 
child in need. Both a friend and a stranger watch and decide not 
to help; children were then asked which character was “meaner” 
for not helping. They found that, similarly in the Rhodes (2012) 
study, 5-year-olds do not distinguish between unhelpful 
strangers and unhelpful friends. This could be the result of 
younger children lacking the belief that helping is a mandatory 
social action (in line with Rhodes’ interpretation), or it could be 
due to children believing that helping is obligatory for both 
friends and strangers, and that this obligation is at an equal level 
for both types of individuals.  
 In follow-up studies, Marshall and colleagues (in prep) 
have found that the second explanation is correct by running a 
similar study that asked children whether they thought 
characters (parent, friend, stranger) had to help another 
character in need in a variety of short vignettes. Marshall et al. 
(in prep) find that across cultures (United States, Japan, 
Germany, Uganda, and India) younger children believe helping 
is obligated regardless of the social relationship between the two 
individuals; a parent is as obligated to help their child as a 
stranger is to help an unknown other. This would suggest that 
younger children do not consider social relationship as much 
when determining who is obligated to help, resulting in them 
finding helping to be obligated across broader contexts than 
older children.   
With these mixed findings in mind, we have designed 
a study to investigate both children’s group-based expectation 
and obligation judgments on helping behaviors in a novel 
coalitional intergroup context. By doing so, we can potentially 
replicate Rhodes’ (2012) finding that younger children are more 
inclined to think in-groups are more likely to help each other 
than out-groups (expectation judgments). But we can better 
interpret these findings by asking children explicitly about 
obligation (obligation judgments). To do so, we presented 
children with two novel groups and gave them a variety of 
scenarios in which one child is in need and another (whose 
group membership varies) is a bystander. We asked children 
expectation questions as well as obligation questions. 
 
2. POTENTIAL HYPOTHESES 
We expected we would see one of three possible 
results. One possibility is the universalism hypothesis: children 
start out thinking we should help everyone regardless of their 
group affiliation. As they get older, children then become more 
selective and consider obligations to help to only be directed 
towards the in-group.  
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 Another possibility is the early group hypothesis: 
children start out thinking they are only obligated to help in-
group members and these judgments do not change as they age. 
If this is correct, it would indicate that children begin with 
universalist beliefs in regards to social relationships (Marshall 
et al., 2019; Marshall et al., prep) and that these beliefs do not 
change as they age. 
Lastly, it is also possible that children start out thinking 
they are obligated to help everyone and that these opinions do 
not change as they get older: the egalitarian hypothesis. We 
expect this outcome to be less likely due to prior relevant 
research that has found age differences (Rhodes, 2012; Marshall 
et al., in prep) and lack of results that support the absence of age 




We tested children ranging from four to nine years of 
age in order to be consistent with the ages used in previous 
studies on in-group obligations in children. A power analysis 
revealed that we needed to test approximately 162 participants 
(27 participants per categorical age group) to have 95% power 
to observe an interaction effect of small to medium size (f = .18; 
α = .05). We thus aimed to test approximately 27 children per 
categorical age. We stopped data collection on the last day in 
which the final child in a given age range was tested. In doing 
so, we ultimately tested 199 children between the ages of four 
and nine (M = 7.11, SD = 1.76; 32 4-year-olds, 31 5-year-olds, 
32 6-year-olds, 29 7-year-olds, 34 8-year-olds, 41 9-year-olds). 
This sample size and power analysis were pre-registered at 
as.predicted.com: https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=h2gr9d. 
Participants were placed in categorical age groups, one for each 
of the six ages studied (four to nine years). 
 Ninety-nine participants were tested in the lab at Yale 
University. Thirty-three additional children were tested at the 
Peabody Museum, 28 at Central Park in Manhattan, 17 at 
festivals in the New Haven area, and 21 at local schools and 
programs; one participant’s location is unknown. One hundred 
and sixteen participants were female (58.3%). The final sample 
was 69.3% White, 7.5% East Asian, 6.5% Black, 4% Hispanic, 
and 2% South Asian. 10.6% reported as “other” or did not report 
ethnicity. We did not find any effects of demographic variables, 
nor the testing location, in our study. No participants were 
excluded. 
 
3.2 Design, Materials, and Procedure 
This study used a 2 (Social Group: in-group, out-group) 
x 2 (Scenario: hungry, hurt) within-subjects factorial design, 
resulting in four total scenarios. We asked questions that 
measured two dependent variables—expectations and 
obligations—resulting in eight total stories.  
 First, each participant was given a brief introduction to 
the groups. We based this introduction off of Rhodes’ (2012) 
study on novel groups. This described Flurps as the “red group” 
and Zazzes as the “blue group” and additionally described each 
group as building separate towers in order to win a prize during 
a non-competitive event (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Introduction to novel groups—Flurps and Zazzes.  
 
Participants were next presented with eight stories—
four “hungry” scenarios and four “hurt” scenarios; four 
involved in-group interactions and four involved out-group 
3
Cecil et al.: Children's Reasoning About In-group and Out-group Obligations
Published by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale, 2020
   
        YURJ | yurj.yale.edu                     
Social Sciences 
   4  
 
      OCIAL SCIENCES | Psychology                       VOL. 1.1 | Dec. 2020 
interactions. Finally, four featured questions about expectations, 
and four featured questions about obligations. The ordering of 
these questions was counter-balanced across participants. 
Similarly, questions involving hungry scenarios were asked 
together and questions involving hurt scenarios were asked 
together. Whether participants were asked about in-group 
(versus out-group) interactions was randomized within each 
scenario type. The gender of the characters in the stories 
matched the participant’s gender.  
The hungry stories featured a character without food 
while at a fair and feeling very hungry, while the hurt stories 
featured a character feeling sad after falling and hurting 
themselves at the park. In both stories another character sees the 
initial character in need (see Figure 2).   
 
Figure 2. Examples of the hungry (top) and hurt (bottom) 
stories for both in-group helping and out-group helping.  
 
For the expectation questions, participants were asked 
if the bystander will help the character in need. If they answered 
“yes”, they were asked how much they think the bystander will 
help (only a teeny bit, a little bit, or a lot). If they answered “no”, 
they were asked no further questions about the vignette. This 
measured children’s expectations of helping behaviors toward 
in-group members in comparison to out-group members.  
For the obligation question, participants were asked whether 
they thought the bystander had to help. If they answered “yes”, 
they were asked how much they thought the bystander had to 
help (only a teeny bit, a little bit, or a lot). If they answered “no” 
they were asked no further questions about the vignette. This 
measured whether children think group members are obligated 
to help other in-group members more than out-group members. 
We based our wording of this question off of work by Kalish 
and Lawson (2008).  
Upon completion of all eight stories, the participant 
was brought to a demographics form to be filled out by the 
researcher. This form collected information on the participants’ 





We examined participants’ responses in terms of 
expectations to help others via a mixed modal ANOVA. We did 
not find a Social Group x Age x Scenario interaction, F(1, 195) 
= 1.77, p = .185, ηp2 = .009, so we collapsed across Scenario. 
In doing so, we found a Social Group x Age interaction, F = (1, 
196) = 12.48, p = .001, ηp2 = .060.  
To assess the nature of this interaction, we examined 
the simple effect of Social Group at -1.5 SD (Age: 4.48) and 
+1.5 SD (Age 9.74). At younger ages, there was not a simple 
effect of Social Group, F(1, 196) = 3.19, p = .076, ηp2 = .016, 
although it was marginally significant. Children expected in-
group members, M = 3.10, SD = 1.85, and out-group members, 
M = 2.85, SD = 1.38, to help one another. At the higher ages, 
there was a simple effect of Social Group, F(1, 196) = 58.58, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .230: children expected in-group members, M = 
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3.69, SD = 1.85, to help one another more than out-group 
members, M = 2.62, SD = 1.96. See Figure 3. 
 We also analyzed the data in a binary formation—just 
“yes” and “no” responses—to examine whether children 
expected in-groups (and out-groups) to help compared to 
chance. We found that the youngest children (4-year-olds) and 
oldest children (9-year-olds) considered both in-groups and out-
groups likely to help compared to chance, ps < .001. 
 
Figure 3. Children’s expectations of whether or not a bystander 
will help an in-group member (red) or out-group member (blue) 
in need. The y-axis represents how much they think the person 
will help. The error bands represent plus or minus one SE.  
 
4.2 Obligations 
To examine participants’ responses in terms of 
obligations to help others, we conducted a mixed model 
ANOVA with Social Group (in-group, out-group) and Scenario 
(fair, park) as a within-subjects factor and child’s Age as a 
continuous predictor. We did not find a Social Group x Age x 
Scenario interaction, F(1, 194) = 1.23, p = .269, ηp2 = .006, so 
we collapsed across Scenario. In doing so, contrary to our 
expectations, we did not find a Social Group x Age interaction, 
F(1, 195) = 2.32, p = .129, ηp2 = .012. We then decided to 
collapse across age, and we found a main effect of Social Group, 
F(1, 197) = 25.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .114. Children, regardless of 
age, rated in-group members as more obligated to help one 
another, M = 3.11, SD = 1.06, than out-group members, M = 
2.75, SD = 1.14. See Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Average degree to which participants thought the 
bystander character was obligated to help the character in need. 
The error bars represent plus or minus one SE.  
 
 We also examined whether children in general 
(collapsed across age) considered in-groups (and out-groups) 
obligated to help one another compared to chance. We did so by 
just examining participants’ binary (“yes” versus “no”) 
responses. In doing so, we found that all children in general 
consider both in-groups and out-groups obligated to help one 
another, ps < .001, although children consider in-groups more 
obligated to help one another than out-groups. 
We opted to examine the Social Group x Age 
interaction for exploratory purposes, as it was necessary to 
assess the validity of the universalism hypothesis. These 
findings were not significant. We still examined the simple 
effect of Social Group at -1.5 SD (Age: 4.48) and +1.5 SD (Age: 
5
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9.7). At the younger ages, there was not a simple effect of Social 
Group, F(1, 195) = 2.39, p = .124, ηp2 = .012. Children thought 
in-group members were as obligated to help each other, M = 
3.35, SD = 1.88, as out-group members, M = 2.37, SD = 1.99. 
See Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. The degree to which children think bystanders are 
obligated to help an in-group member (red) or out-group 
member (blue) in need. The y-axis represents how much they 
think the person will help. The error bands represent plus or 
minus one SE.  
 
We also analyzed the data in a binary formation—just 
“yes” and “no” responses—to examine whether children 
considered in-groups (and out-groups) obligated to help one 
another compared to chance. We found that the youngest 
children (4-year-olds) and oldest children (9-year-olds) 
considered both in-groups and out-groups obligated to help 




4.3 Correlations amongst all relevant variables 
 
Additionally, we examined the correlations amongst all 
relevant variables (see Table 1). We found that age positively 
correlates with increasingly thinking in-group members will 
help one another, r = .25, p < .011, although age does not 
correlate with expecting that out-group members will not help 
one another, r = -.08, p = .29. With respect to obligations, we 
found that age negatively correlates with thinking that there is 
an obligation for in-group members to help each other, r = -.15, 
p = .038. This is true of the correlation between age and thinking 
that there is an obligation for out-group members to help each 
other as well, r = -.23, p = .001. 
  
1) 2)  3)  4)  5)  
1)  Age -- .25*** -.08 -.15* -.23*** 
2) Expectations of in-
group help **** -- .26*** .26*** .06 
3) Expectations of 
between-group help 
  -- .18*** .35*** 
4) In-group help 
obligations 
   -- .59*** 
5) Out-group help 
obligations 
    -- 
Table 1. Correlations amongst all relevant variables.  
 
We also examined whether age correlated with 
considering helping less obligatory in general. That is, 
collapsing across in-group and out-group helping, does age 
correlate with thinking helping is an obligation? We found it 
did, r = -.22, p = .002: as children get older, they tend to think 
helping is less obligatory in general. 
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Figure 6. The degree to which children think bystanders are 
obligated to help someone-in-need (collapsed across group 
membership). The y-axis represents how much they think the 




Our data shows that bias towards in-group members in 
“helping” situations does not emerge until age 8 or 9 in terms of 
expectations. This is in line with the universalism hypothesis: 
we begin life thinking we are obligated to help everyone, and 
these beliefs shift as we age. These results conceptually 
replicate Rhodes’ (2012) work because it corroborates her 
findings that younger children are non-discriminating. We also 
found that children expected individuals to help members of 
both groups, regardless of their affiliation. That is, although 
older children considered in-groups more likely to help one 
another than out-groups, they considered out-groups more likely 
to help one another compared to chance.  
The story is more complicated for obligations. We did 
not find an interaction between age and group. This supports the 
early group hypothesis: children seem to think you have to help 
in-group members more than out-group members, regardless of 
age. Like for expectations, though, children tend to consider 
out-groups obligated to help one another, despite considering in-
groups as more obligated to help one another. This finding is 
important because it shows that Rhodes’ (2012) interpretation is 
incorrect: even though children discriminate between in-group 
and out-group obligations, they all think that you have to help 
everyone, you just have to help an in-group member more than 
an out-group member. Contrary to the interpretation Rhodes 
(2012) presents, children are not indifferent to helping, it is 
something they think we are all obligated to do but at slightly 
different degrees depending on social group membership.  
These findings show that, although children tend to 
think that we are less obligated to help others as they get older, 
they still expect us to help each other at all ages. Although this 
help is expected and considered to be obligated to occur to a 
higher degree towards in-group members, children believe that 
out-groups should receive help and will receive help as well.  
It is also important to consider limitations of this study. 
One limitation is that our sample comes predominantly from 
Yale University spaces, mostly the Peabody Museum and our 
lab. Families that participate in our studies are usually middle-
to-upper class. Consequently, generalizability is limited, as 
lower-income families are not equally represented. Another 
limitation is that we do not measure children’s behaviors, but 
rather their beliefs. Thus, we do not know what the downstream 
consequences are for these effects. Lastly, this is just one study; 
replicating it would be important in validating its findings.  
There are many potential follow-ups that we could 
conduct to clarify these results further. One involves changing 
the nature of the groups. We utilized novel groups because we 
wanted to ensure children had limited exposure to the groups in 
question, but these were very meaningless. It would be 
interesting to follow-up with a study where the groups are 
described as competitive (Rhodes & Brickman, 2011) or where 
they have more meaning, like a sports team. It is possible in such 
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a case that we will find even stronger evidence for the early 
group hypothesis. Second, we could create a study where 
children are primed with notions of collectivism to see whether 
this promotes more biased reasoning in older children. Finally, 
we could conduct a study using real-world groups such as race 
and gender (like Weller and Lagattuta) to see if our findings 
remain consistent in previously established social groups. 
 To conclude, by asking children questions about their 
expectations and obligations for characters to help in-group 
versus out-group members, we found that, in line with the 
universalism hypothesis, children do not show group-based bias 
until they are approximately 8 years old. Additionally, in line 
with the early group hypothesis, children think we are more 
obligated to help in-group members compared to out-group 
members, even though children still think we are obligated to 
help out-group members. While this study has expanded our 
knowledge of how children reason about group-based 
obligations, there is still much to explore. We hope to do this by 
introducing competition between the two groups, and by testing 
real-world rather than novel groups. 
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